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"[O]pen trade is not contrary to the interest of working people. Competition
and integration lead to stronger growth, more and better jobs, more widely
shared gains. Renewed protectionism in any of our nations would lead to a
spiral of retaliation that would diminish the standard of living for working
people everywhere."2
President Bill Clinton
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REvmw.
Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and Former
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board (1994-1998). I am most grateful
to Brian Bercusson, Professor of Law at King's College, University of London and
Herman Phleger Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, for extensive
comments on an earlier draif. Similarly, I express my appreciation to Professor
Richard Steinberg of UCLA Law School who improved my understanding of
World Trade Organization procedures through both discussion as well as a mem-
orandun on this subject with which he provided me. Of course, I take full re-
sponsibility for any deficiencies or errors in this Article.
Also, the author expresses his appreciation for valuable research assistance pro-
vided by Michael Dominic Meuti, Stanford Law School, 2003, Sarah Preston,
Brown University, A.B., 1999, and Nina-Louisa Arold, Stanford Law School,
2002.
1. This Article is based upon the Wayne Morse Public Lecture provided by the
author when serving as the Wayne Morse Chair of Law and Politics at the
University of Oregon on February 28, 2001. It has been reshaped and revised for
the Lane Lecture presented at the University of Nebraska College of Law on
April 8, 2002. My ideas were sharpened by virtue of seminars that I presented on
the themes articulated in this Article to my colleagues at Stanford Law School in
January 2002 and at a seminar organized by Professor Gary Williams, Stanford
Law School '76, at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles in February 2002. The title
is borrowed from WALTER J. BLUIu & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION. (1953).
2. William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the President to the International Labor
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I. INTRODUCTION
In many respects the current debate about international labor
standards is a mirror image of the tension between labor law and anti-
trust policies in the American domestic arena. From a labor policy
perspective, a substantial portion of the dynamics relates to the at-
tempt to improve working conditions so as to promote the dignity of
labor and, in so doing, an environment of enhanced living standards.
The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 in this country states that labor is
not an article of commerce and is thus a cost of production that is gen-
uinely unique.3 This is the direct link to the international human
rights campaign which has received more prominence in the United
States over the past three decades and its connection to the employ-
ment relationship.
But at the same time, unimpeded trade is designed to promote
competition, which benefits the consuming public through more effi-
cient processes and thus lower prices. The unprecedented prosperity
of the past five and a half decades is undoubtedly attributable, in sub-
stantial part, to the rejection of the Smoot-Hawley Act4 sponsoring
protectionism and the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act
of 19345 which led to the decline in average world tariffs from approxi-
mately 40 percent in 1947 to less than 5 percent at the beginning of
the last decade.6
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) has noted that in the post-World War II period, the worldwide
increase in trade between the industrialized world and low wage de-
veloping countries is generally associated with a major contribution to
economic growth.7 As has been noted:
Organization Conference (United Nations Building, Geneva, Switzerland, June
16, 1999), at http://clinton2.nara.govWI/New/Europe-9906/html/Speeches/
990616.html.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (recognizing that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce"); see Paul O'Higgins, Labour Is Not a Com-
modity: An Irish Contribution to International Labour Law, 26 INDUST. L.J. 225
(1997) (describing the Irish origin of and Australian contribution to the idea that
labor is not a commodity). This Article provides understanding about American
Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers' promotion of the idea both in
1914 at the time of the Clayton Antitrust Act and shortly thereafter at the Treaty
of Versailles. See infra text accompanying notes 15.
4. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
5. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, pt. III, Pub. L. No. 316, 48 Stat. 943
(current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (2000)).
6. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE (2002); John 0. McGinnis & Mark L.
Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REV. 511, 516 (2000).
7. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, EMPLOY-
MENT AND LABoUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERs' RIGHTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 124 (1996) [hereinafter OECD 1996].
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While living standards in developing countries generally lag behind those of
the developed world, some developing countries are catching up-namely,
those that are open to trade. Indeed, the more open developing countries are
to trade, the faster their standards of living converge with those of the devel-
oped world. For instance, thirty years ago, South Korea was as poor as
Ghana. Today, in large part because of trade liberalization, South Korea is as
wealthy as Portugal, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) exceed-
ing $12,000. Countries as diverse as Nicaragua, Poland, and New Zealand
have also benefited enormously from trade liberalization.8
American antitrust law has trumped labor law in the domestic
arena when unions, particularly with the aid of employers who have
their own concerns about product competitiveness and the product
market, build walls around themselves so as to shelter themselves
from competition, thus injuring the public interest.9 The ongoing co-
nundrum lies in the fact that labor unions and thus the policies that
support them proceed from the assumption that competition between
workers in the same facilities, companies and industries is at odds
with their collective interests. The idea of trade unionism and the col-
lective bargaining process is thus working at cross-purposes with anti-
trust policy which promotes competitiveness and, historically, deemed
attempts to invoke a unity of interest as collusion or unlawful re-
straint of trade.1O Now the debate about international labor stan-
dards has put this policy conflict into the global arena.
These competing policies are further dramatized by the fact that
the labor movement's drive toward better employment conditions has
its roots in both moral and economic concerns."1 The idea of dignity is
what makes some of this subject matter similar to human rights is-
sues throughout the world. And the focus is egalitarian, an attempt to
distribute more fairly the balance of power between workers and em-
ployers-to "level the playing field," in modern parlance. Yet simulta-
neously, the attempt to improve conditions necessarily speaks in
terms of comparisons and comparability and thus cuts across more
8. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 6, at 521-522 (footnotes omitted).
9. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
10. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
11. Interestingly, the free-trade camp has recently picked up on the use of morality
rhetoric as well. See, e.g, Marc Lacey, Bush Declares Freer Trade a Moral Issue;
Chides Critics, N.Y. Toms, May 8, 2001, at All. Yet this rhetoric lost its spring
when the Bush Administration fashioned a substantial steel industry tariff in
early 2002. See Edward Alden, Steel Trade Dispute-Republicans Sacrifice Free
Trade Rhetoric to Bat for US Workers, FIN. TnmEs (London), Mar. 7, 2002; Playing
Politics with Trade, N.Y. Tias, Mar. 5, 2002, at A24; Greg Rushford, Bush Steps
in a Steel Trap, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2002, at A16; David E. Sanger, Bush Puts
Tariffs of as Much as 30% on Steel Imports, N.Y. T~mms, Mar. 6, 2002, at B1;
Richard W. Stevenson, Steel Tariffs Weaken Bush's Global Hand, N.Y. Toms,
Mar. 6, 2002, at Cl. On the relationship of the Bush tariff policy to international
unilateralism, see Paul Krugman, America the Scofflaw, N.Y. Tmnxs, May 24,
2002, at A27.
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than the work station, i.e., the plant, company, and industry as a basis
for raising employees up from demeaning circumstances and warring
against unfair competition between workers.
The idea of international labor standards first gained momentum
in early Nineteenth Century Great Britain with Robert Owen as their
proponent-and it was catalyzed by the expansion of the antislavery
movement. Advocacy for this idea found strength in France, Switzer-
land and Germany, and proponents claimed that basic human rights
were involved inasmuch as the benefits had their source in morality.
But then as now, an argument for uniformity across nations, which
can override the nation state's sovereignty, was put forward on the
grounds that nations providing improved wages and benefits would
otherwise lose their competitive position. Thus, advocacy flourished,
and continues to flourish, in the richer countries. Yet it is an argu-
ment that arises in the context of advanced countries competing
amongst themselves when the question of comparative advantage en-
joyed by developing countries, existing at a different economic state of
development, is unknown.
The first of major organized meetings was organized by the Swiss
government in 1881, and dealt with international legislation on facto-
ries. After a failure to attract sympathetic recruits, Switzerland tried
again with a conference planned for Berne in 1889-but it was not
held, though four other countries accepted invitations. In 1890, Ger-
many organized a conference in Berlin that fourteen states attended.
This conference lasted ten days, but produced no policy conclusions.
Subsequent meetings were held in Brussels (the United States partici-
pated in this one along with twelve European countries), Paris, Basel,
Cologne and, once again, Berne. 12
Between 1904 and 1915 there were more than twenty bilateral
agreements on labor issues between various European countries and
in one case even the United States. Italy, France, and Germany were
the most frequently involved. Most often these agreements related to
issues which have clear transnational implications such as insurance
compensation for accidents involving citizens of one country while
working in another. Little more developed. Indeed, in the domestic
arena in countries like the United States, both policy and constitu-
tional hurdles were placed in the way of social and economic regula-
tion of even child labor, 13 though the "Brandeis Brief' produced a
12. See generally Stanley L. Engerman, The History and Political Economy of Inter-
national Labor Standards (paper presented at a seminar on international labor
standards in Stockholm, Sweden, August 23-24, 2001 organized by the Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Expert Group on Development Issues).
13. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that a District of Colum-
bia regulation setting minimum wages for female workers violated economic due
process); see also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of protective
legislation for women. 14
At the conclusion of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson's
sponsorship of international democratic rights was seen as a way to
avoid future conflicts. The Treaty of Versailles created the League of
Nations as an instrument to obtain this objective but the United
States did not ratify it, largely due to the urging of Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Thus the United States joined neither
the League nor its new entity designed to promote international labor
standards, the International Labor Organization, which was created
as a part of the League in 1919.15 The League failed when Axis ag-
gression went unremedied, but the ILO survived the League's demise.
In part this is attributable to the fact that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Administration decided to opt for United States member-
ship in the ILO in 1934,16 giving it a measure of support that the
League never had. Moreover, the ILO was never directly tarnished by
the 1930s military aggression, as was the League itself, and was thus
better positioned to survive. At the end of World War II it became an
agency of the United Nations.
Simultaneously, the idea that the repression of labor, most dra-
matically through forced labor as well as other antidemocratic policies
in Germany, Italy and Japan, was a substantial factor in international
discord, prompted the Allies to feature labor policy as part of the occu-
pations of both Germany and Japan. The MacArthur Occupation in
Japan creates a policy in which explicit constitutional rights for labor,
unknown in the United States, were promulgated.17
In its early years, the ILO was concerned with minimum condi-
tions of employment such as hours of work and night work. But in the
midst of World War II it promoted the Philadelphia Conference, which
led to the key Conventions promoting both the right of workers to or-
ganize (Convention 87)18 and to engage in the collective bargaining
14. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding against a Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge a statute setting a limitation on the number of hours women
could work in a day).
15. See ILO History, at http:/www.ilo.orgfpublic/englishlabout/history.htm (last vis-
ited May 13, 2002). See generally EDWARD C. LORENZ, DEFINING GLOBAL JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS POLICY (2001).
16. See ILO History, supra note 15.
17. WILLLw B. GOULD IV, JAPAN's RESHAPING OF AMERiCAN LABOR LAW 30 (1984).
18. Convention 87 delineates guarantees of freedom of association including employ-
ees' right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing, to draft the
constitutions and rules of such organizations, ILO gloss grafted on by virtue of
the ILO Freedom of Association Committee relating to the right to strike, and to
do all of this without prior authorization. See also OECD 1996, supra note 7, at
31-32.
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process (Convention 98).19 The preamble to the ILO Constitution re-
flects the dual objectives for international labor standards, which first
emerged in the nineteenth century at the time of the agency's creation
in 1919. The idea of international labor standards has always
presented two faces as the result of these dual objectives.
The preamble states that, "universal and lasting peace can be es-
tablished only if it is based upon social justice."2 0 Moreover, the pre-
amble also states that the "failure of any nation to adopt humane
conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which
desire to improve the conditions in their own countries." 2 1 This is the
idea of unfair competition, an idea that had found a receptive audience
in Europe much earlier. 22 It is also reflected in portions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act's own preamble, enacted to promote free-
dom of association and collective bargaining in the United States23
shortly after the United States joined the ILO. This aspect of interna-
tional labor standards and the fact that the richer nations continue to
sponsor them plagued the movement from its inception through the
turn of this new century. It figures substantially in the debate known
as the "the race to the bottom" which, some contend, emerged because
of the absence of some kind of international regulation.2 4
A final factor in the equation relates to global poverty-a theme
addressed by the first portion of the ILO preamble. There has been a
19. By guaranteeing employees' right to engage in collective bargaining, Convention
98 gives teeth to Convention 87. See id. at 32. Convention 98 guarantees the
right to collective bargaining by requiring that workers be protected against anti-
union discrimination and that the law provide "adequate protection against acts
of interference between workers and employers organizations." Id.
20. ILO CONS., at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/abouttiloconst.htm#pre.
21. Id.
22. OECD 1996, supra note 7, at 11.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). Interestingly, in enacting the NLRA, Congress an-
nounced that a primary purpose of this policy was to remove the downward pres-
sure on wages that a failure to protect collective bargaining rights produces.
Congress stated,
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bar-
gaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest,
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce by ... causing diminution of employment and wages in such
volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flow-
ing from or into the channels of commerce.
Id. Congress also noted, "The inequality of bargaining power between employees
... and employers . . . tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners . . . and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions
within and between industries." Id.
24. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND CORE LAiOUR STANDARDS 39 (2000) [hereinafter OECD
2000] (reviewing the "race to the bottom" literature).
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dramatic decline in foreign assistance provided by the industrialized
nations to the developing countries. Whatever the virtues of free
trade-and they are obviously considerable-their spread and appli-
cation have been uneven, leaving African and Muslim countries dis-
proportionately beyond their beneficence. 25  Even the Bush
Administration, its proposals hobbled with inadequacy, 26 appears to
have accepted the maxim that global poverty can be diminished only
with aid and trade operating in tandem.
Despite being the wealthiest nation in the world, the United States
has done surprisingly little to help developing countries. The decline
is particularly dramatic in the United States when one realizes that
3.21 percent of GDP was provided in foreign in aid in 1949.27 Admit-
tedly, this statistic is somewhat distorted because the United States
was providing so much to war-torn Europe through the Marshall Plan
so as to get that continent on its feet. Yet, even in the 1960s foreign
assistance fell below one percent of GDP. Now the United States ex-
pends 0.08 percent on foreign assistance28 and has balked at the
United Nations' target of 0.7 percent, established to halve world pov-
erty by 2015.
The United States not only failed to keep up with its own past per-
formance in the foreign aid arena-it is also currently failing to keep
25. See Kofi A. Annan, Trade and Aid in a Changed World, N.Y. Tnmzs, Mar. 19,
2002, at A27; Globalisation-Is It at Risk, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, at 65; Joseph
Kahn, Losing Faith: Globalization Proves Disappointing, N.Y. TIEzs, Mar. 21,
2002, at A6; Joseph Kahn & Tim Weiner, World Leaders Rethinking Strategy on
Aid to Poor, N.Y. TnmEs, Mar. 18, 2002, at A3; Tim Weiner, More Entreaties in
Monterrey for More Aid to the Poor, N.Y. Tnms, Mar. 22, 2002, at A10. And see
also some of the pernicious consequences of free trade set forth in Alice H. Ares-
den, Why Are Globalizers So Provincial?, N.Y. Tmnis, Jan. 31, 2002, at A25; Marc
Edelman, Price of Free Trade: Famine, L- Tnmms, Mar. 22, 2002; Jeffrey E. Gar-
ten, Free Trade Has To Be Managed, N.Y. Tnwzs, July, 18, 2002, at A23; Joseph
Kahn, Globalism Unites a Many-Striped Multitude of Foes, N.Y. TmtEs, Apr. 15,
2000, at AS; Louis Uchitelle, Challenging the Dogmas of Free Trade, N.Y. Twms,
Feb. 9, 2002, at A15, A17; Juan Forero, Still Poor, Latin Americans Protest Push
for Open Markets, N.Y. Tms July 19, 2002, at Al, A7. Nonetheless, open trade
policies, on balance, do seem to have better results than where they are absent.
Help in the Right Places-Measuring Aid Effectiveness, ECONOmiST, Mar. 16,
2002, at 73.
26. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush, in Monterrey, Speaks of Conditional Global Aid,
N.Y. Tims, Mar. 23, 2002, at A7; Forging the Monterrey Consensus, N.Y. Toms,
Mar. 24, 2002, at 14; Chris Kraul & Edwin Chen, U.S., Europe to Tout Pledges of
Development Aid at Summit, L.A. Tnmis, Mar. 21, 2002, at A3; George Melloan,
In Monterrey, Getting RealAbout Foreign Aid, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at A23;
Tim Weiner, More Aid, More Need: Pledges Still Falling Short, N.Y. Tnms, Mar.
24, 2002, at 4. But see Jorge Castafieda, US Aid Pledge Puts a New Spin on
Mexico Conference, FIN. Tnms (London), Mar. 18, 2002, at 14; Thomas L. Fried-
man, Better Late Than .... N.Y. Tnms, Mar. 17, 2002, at 15.
27. Security over Succor, 32 NAT'L. J. 1824 (2000).
28. Henri Migala, Development's Role in Ensuring Global Security, SAN DIEGO Bus.
J., Dec. 17, 2002, at 39.
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up with the international community. Although foreign aid expendi-
tures dropped nearly across the board in the 1990s, 29 the United
States has led this race to the bottom. In the late 1980s, Japan de-
throned the U.S. as the world's number one provider of foreign aid.30
Today the U.S. ranks dead last among Western developed nations in
percentage of GDP devoted to foreign aid.31 Scandinavian countries
have consistently met the UN's foreign aid expenditure goal of 0.7 per-
cent of GDP.32 Other Western industrialized countries' expenditures
have also dwarfed the US' in recent years. Denmark is currently set-
ting the pace, spending a full one percent of its GDP on foreign aid.33
France has managed to devote 0.6 percent of its GDP to foreign aid,34
and the EU average stands at about 0.3 percent.3 5 The OCED aver-
age is also 0.3 percent, almost four times that of the U.S.36 Italy and
Greece are the only Western countries that devote 0.2 percent of their
GDP to aid. At the other end of the continuum is Demark with 1.06
percent, the Netherlands 0.84%, and Sweden at 0.8%.37
Moreover, in responding to the United Nations' initiative the
United States was "careful to avoid any language that could have
weakened the mandate of the [International Monetary Fund and
World Bank] or. .. increased the say of the UN General Assembly,
where every country holds an equal vote."3 8 The 2002 Bush Adminis-
tration proposals for foreign aid increases leave the United States lag-
ging behind European generosity and good policy. The Bush
29. Indicators, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1998, at 104.
30. Foreign Aid; Stingy Sam, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 1989, at 26.
31. Migala, supra note 28.
32. Worlds Apart: The Social Summit, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 42.
33. Henrik Bering, Denmark, the Euro, and Fear of the Foreign, PoIY REv., Dec. 1,
2000, at 63.
34. France's Changing View of the World, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 47.
35. Id.
36. Unfortunately, the poorest developing nations receive surprisingly little of the
foreign aid provided by industrialized countries. According to the UN Develop-
ment Programme, ten nations that contain two-thirds of the world's poorest peo-
ple receive only one-third of the world's foreign aid. The Kindness of Strangers,
ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 19. The rest of the aid is directed toward countries
that are, by comparison, rather wealthy. For example, between 1982 and 1991,
Israel and Egypt received the lion's share of US aid. During that period, Israel
received $29.9 billion and Egypt received $23.2 billion from the United States.
Foreign Aid; Kind Words, Closed Wallet, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 26. By
way of comparison, Turkey ranked third on the United States' list for that time
period, receiving only $6.9 billion. Id. Since that time, the pattern has contin-
ued. Israel receives the most aid per capita, with about $400 of aid going to Israel
for every citizen. See Emerging Market Indicators: Official Aid, ECONOMIST, Feb.
14, 1998, at 104.
37. John Cassidy, Helping Hands: How Foreign Aid Could Benefit Everybody, NEw
YORKER, Mar. 18, 2002, at 64.
38. Alan Beattie and Carola Hoyos, US Blocks Move for Big Rise in Aid to Poor Coun-
tries, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 28, 2002, at 5.
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Administration appears to continue to denigrate the significance of
foreign aid to the well-being of developing countries and, notwith-
standing the fact that country to country aid is provided in the Middle
East, for instance, without scrutiny of the reforms undertaken by the
recipient countries, it insists that that the 80 percent success rate of
the World Bank and IVIF is "not enough" for today's occupants of the
White House. 39 As John Cassidy has noted:
Between 1970 and 1993, developing countries with good economic policies but
low aid payments grew at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent per capita, whereas
developing countries with good economic policies and high aid payments grew
almost twice as fast, at an annual rate of 3.7 per cent.4 0
My judgment is that these two issues, aid and trade, are deeply con-
nected.41 The lowering of tariff barriers in the rich countries is impor-
tant for the poor nations.4 2 Moreover, the issue of aid directly affects
the implementation feasibility of some of the international labor stan-
dards, most particularly child labor which requires financial aid to
families will lose income as the result of effective child labor prohibi-
tions. Finally, it seems clear that the threat posed to the West by
those whom globalization has overlooked has been made dramatically
manifest by the events of September 11, 2001. Global poverty and dis-
content are best challenged through practical standards, domestic pol-
icies which are designed to address the concerns of workers dislocated
as the result of free trade, and dramatically increased foreign assis-
tance to the developing countries of the world.
II. THE POLICY DEBATE ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS TODAY
The idea of international human rights, of course, has gained mo-
mentum through other post-World War II instruments such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,43 the International Covenant
39. Cassidy, supra note 37, at 66.
40. Id. at 63.
41. But opening up markets makes little difference if countries lack the ca-
pability to produce for them-if, for instance, they do not have the trans-
port to bring their goods to market. By the same token, the mantra that
countries should turn to the private sector is misleading. Foreign invest-
ment is important, but it goes to relatively few countries and in rela-
tively few sectors. Foreign direct investment misses out on rural roads,
on health and education-all important to developing countries.
The Monterrey conference was long on rhetoric but, especially be-
cause of Washington's refusal to make serious commitments either on
aid or trade, it was short on action.
Joseph Stiglitz, Overseas Aid Is Money Well Spent, FiN. Tnmrs (London), Apr. 15,
2002, at 13.
42. Alan Beattie, Raw Deal for Poor Nations Limits Backing for Free Trade, FiN.
TIess (London), Apr. 12, 2002, at 3.
43. UN-V RsAL DzcLARATIoN oF HumrA RIGHTs, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948).
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)44 and the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).45 All of
these agreements label the right to freedom of association as a funda-
mental right. In this country, these policies began to flourish in the
1970s through the Carter Administration's adoption of an interna-
tional human rights program. 46
And the past decade has witnessed the emergence of Yugoslavian
and Rwandan war crimes tribunals as well as the threatened criminal
prosecution of General Augusto Pinochet in Great Britain, and thus,
for the first time since the Nuremberg trials, attempted to apply crimi-
nal prosecutions internationally. The European Court of Human
Rights has focused attention on principles which transcend and
supercede national law of the Member States of the Council of
Europe.4 7
But the more recent debate about international labor standards
has found its focus in two phenomena. The first is the growing income
and wage inequality in the United States4S and, in some measure,
Great Britain. It is contended this trend has its roots in unprece-
44. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976,
adopted by the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992).
45. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CuLTurRAL RIGHTS, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976).
46. See Robert J. Peterson, Comment, Political Realism and the Judicial Imposition
of International Secondary Sanctions: Possibilities from John Doe v Unocal and
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 277, 291 (1998) (noting
the Carter Administration's "stated . . . concern over international human
rights").
47. The European Court of Human Rights has jurisdiction over forty-three member-
states both within and outside the European Union. The court, amongst its du-
ties, resolves disputes involving the interpretation of and adherence to Article 11
of the Convention which protects the right to join unions. For a discussion of the
comparable law in the European Union, see generally BRIAN BERCUSSON, EURo-
PEAN LABOUR LAw 58-63 (1996); P. L. Davies, The Emergence of European Labour
Law, in LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INDUSTRLAL RELATIONS: GAINS AND LOSSES 313,
318-342 (William McCarthy ed., 1992).
48. See generally DEREK BoIK, THE COST OF TALENT: How ExECuTIwEs AND PROFES-
SIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA (1993); JAMES K. GALBRAITH,
CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY (1998). Increases in wealth ine-
quality are further evidence of the increasing inequality in America. For in-
stance, between 1983 and 1998, the bottom 40% of Americans' share of national
wealth dropped from 0.9% to 0.2%. Facts and Figures, at http'/
www.inequality.org/factsfr.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) (citing Edward N.
Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998, (Apr. 2000)). During the
same time period, the middle 20% of Americans' share dropped from 5.2% to
4.5%. Id. The extent of inequality growth is better illustrated by the following
figure: between 1983 and 1998, the bottom 40% of Americans experienced a
76.3% decrease in household net worth, while the top 1% of Americans enjoyed a
42.2% gain. Id.
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dented globalization and unfair trade by countries that undercut the
labor standards in the industrialized world.
The same argument is put forward, perhaps with slightly less in-
tensity, with regard to developments in Europe. There, an inefficient
and inflexible labor market has at least been partially responsible for
double-digit unemployment. However, in Europe this unemployment
exists amidst a strong social safety net-a stark difference from the
American scene, 49 where there are now prospects for an even further
weakened welfare system.50 In short, the difficulty in America is pov-
erty and inequality and in Europe, unemployment and lack of jobs5'
and the contention by some is that globalization has produced these
phenomena.52
Is a "race to the bottom" fueled by free trade policies responsible for
these difficulties? The issue is dramatized not only by the increasing
third world imports in certain labor intensive industries where the
work has been done here by unskilled workers, but also (as the most
favored nations legislative debate in the United States in 2000 testi-
fies)53 by China's emergence as a major player on the international
scene. Its accession to the World Trade Organization demonstrates
this problem vividly.
How can the United States and the industrialized world, it is said,
possibly compete when countries like China with lower labor stan-
dards and miniscule wages are in competition for the same markets?
The difficulty here is that there is not much evidence to support the
proposition that there is a "race to the bottom" with nations in compe-
tition with one another across national boundaries.54 Thus "there is
49. The weakness of our social safety net is evidenced by the fact that the United
States has the highest percentage of children in poverty (20.5%) of any industrial-
ized nation. See SyLviA ANN HIwLrr & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PAR-
ENTs 43 (1998).
50. See Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush's Plan on Welfare Law Increases Work Re-
quirement, N.Y. TIEs, Feb. 26, 2002, at A23.
51. See generally Peter H. Lindert & Jeffirey G. Williamson, Does Globalization Make
the World More Unequal? (Apr. 2001) (NBER Working Paper No. 8228).
52. See generally John Cassidy, Who Killed the Middle Class?, NE-w YORKER, Oct. 16,
1995.
53. For a sample of the debate surrounding the decision to grant normal trade rela-
tions treatment to China, see Providing for Further Consideration of H.R. 4444,
Authorizing Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade Relations
Treatment) to People's Republic of China, 146 CONG. REC. H3652 (2000); Author-
izing Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade Relations Treat-
ment) to People's Republic of China, 146 CONG. REc. H3662 (2000).
54. A similar argument has led to national legislation on the doctrine of preemption
in connection therewith in American labor law. See generally Archibald Cox, Fed-
eralism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 I-Rv. L. REV. 1297 (1954).
National labor legislation is also warranted in many instances by the
need to prevent competition based upon differences in state law.... To-
day enterprises located in states where unionization is fought by the
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little empirical support for a link between increased world trade and a
decline in labor conditions."55 One of the features of this phenomenon
is a comparative disadvantage in technological innovation and labor
productivity in nations which have a comparative advantage in wages
and other benefits.
Professor Robert Flanagan of the Stanford Graduate School of Bus-
iness cites the example of Kenya and the United States in the early
1980s when American wages were 183 times as high as those of Ke-
nya. Ironically, the productivity of an American worker was exactly
183 times greater. 56 As nations and companies become more prosper-
ous, productivity gains through technological innovations allow work-
ers to become richer.
For instance, in less than a decade, Korean wages rose from one-
tenth of American wages to two-fifths. As Professor Gary Fields has
noted:
In the early stages of Korean economic growth, labor market conditions im-
proved via reduction in unemployment with real wages holding essentially
constant.... Labor earnings and per capita growth proceeded apace of one
another thereafter.
These gains led to marked improvements in standards of living, leading
Korea to a place at or near the top of middle-income countries in such dimen-
sions as life expectancy, infant mortality, access to safe water, adult literacy,
and school enrollment rates. The growing richness of the Korean economy
permitted the country to introduce new social programs while improving and
expanding existing ones. Minimum wages were introduced, employment in-
surance systems instituted, and social protections systems created.
At the same time, not every aspect of Korea's social situation was rosy.
Labor unions were suppressed openly in Korea until 1987; the labor move-
ment has only recently won some but not all of the battles in the struggle for
free collective bargaining and freedom of association at the enterprise and fed-
eration levels. Wages were repressed, because of worries that increases in
wages would undercut comparative advantage and threaten economic growth.
(In my view, these worries were misplaced, as indeed is borne out by the con-
tinuation of very rapid economic growth in Korea throughout the 1980s and
most of the 1990s.) The gap in earnings and job opportunities between men
and women remains large, with discrimination against women playing an im-
portant role.
whole business community and where there are repressive laws against
strikes and picketing frequently enjoy advantages which influence the
location of new industries and even the migration of established
concerns.
Id. at 1303. See also William B. Gould IV, The Garmon Case: Decline and
Threshold of Litigating Elucidation, 39 U. DET. L.J. 539 (1962). The same doc-
trine affects state legislation in the international labor policy arena. See Crosby,
Sec'y of Admin. and Fin. of Massachusetts v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000).
55. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 6 (footnotes omitted).
56. Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage
(paper presented at the International Labor Standards Conference, Stanford Law
School, May 20, 2002).
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Notwithstanding these problems, Korea succeeded in dramatically improv-
ing the material well-being of working people. Real wages (adjusted for infla-
tion) grew in Korea at the same rate that per capita Gross National Product
did. This was achieved not by being forced under international pressure to
adhere to externally-set labor standards and not by setting an ambitious do-
mestic labor code with which companies had to comply. Nor were their suc-
cesses brought about by cracking down on unions, placing limits on wages, or
disempowering women in the labor market. The lives of working people in
Korea were improved by economic growth, which tightened the labor market
to the point where full employment was achieved and maintained and wages
and working conditions were pulled up by the rapidly-growing demand for la-
bor. Employers raised wages not because the government told them to, but
because the market told them to ....
Korea's labor market success story is one that has been duplicated in kind
in the other rapidly-growing economies of East and Southeast Asia.... The
achievement of full employment, rapidly-rising real wages, improvements in
the types of jobs that people are in, falling rates of poverty-all of these have
happened because of the success of the East Asian types of growth models.5 7
The tendency for wages and income to increase alongside of pro-
ductivity makes it less likely that the natural tendency of the develop-
ing countries to catch up with technological innovations from the
industrialized world will destroy the economic balance between the
two worlds of countries. States one writer:
The great fear of the race-to-the-bottom crowd-that U.S. multinationals will
locate production facilities in developing countries, exploit local resources, and
reexport back to the United States-has not materialized. In fact, that type of
activity characterizes less than 4 percent of total U.S. investment abroad. The
oft-cited cases of garment facilities based in poor nations and geared to con-
sumers in advanced economies are the exception, not the rule. This exception
is largely due to the low capital investment and importance of labor costs in
the textiles sector.58
The same writer notes that similar patterns have emerged with
regard to environmental standards. "Mexico has enhanced its envi-
ronmental protection efforts while trying to attract investment. The
result? Foreign direct investment around Mexico has exploded, while
the air quality has actually improved."5 9
Two important studies by the OECD issued in 1996 and 2000 are
instructive. These reports publicize a series of findings that are
closely related to the race to the bottom argument. For if in fact there
is a race to the bottom through which the developing countries will
enjoy a comparative advantage, just as the more affluent countries
57. Gary S. Fields, The Role of Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Policies, in SocIAL
DMIENSIONS oF U.S. TRADE PoLIcIEs 169, 178-179 (Alan V. Deardorff& Robert M.
Stern eds., 2000).
58. Daniel W. Drezner, Bottom Feeders, FOREiGN POL'Y, NoviDec. 2000, at 64, 67.
59. Id However, the shantytowns and worker dislocation in that country represent
another more somber side of the Mexican picture. See, e.g., Joel Millman, Mexi-
can Border Workers Suffer as Plants Relocate South, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002,
at A20; Tim Weiner, Monterrey's Poor Sinking in Rising Economic Tide, N.Y.
Tnms, Mar. 21, 2002, at A6.
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
will advocate international labor standards, the developing countries
will resist them because of a feared impact upon their own ability to
compete in world markets.
The OECD has examined the question of whether the adherence to
basic labor standards interferes with their development and places
them at a competitive disadvantage. As the studies indicate, the very
first question that must be answered preliminarily is how one defines
international labor standards at issue.6O There is a consensus about
the identity of a small set of "core" standards, though there is some
dispute about this at the margin.61
These standards, in substantial part, are procedural and do not di-
rectly affect the substance of the employment relationship. They in-
clude freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain
collectively, non-discrimination in employment, the prohibition of
forced labor.62 The issue of child labor and its elimination is usually
considered amongst the so-called core principles, though such policies
carry special problems with them.63
These standards, notes the OECD, are the most important because
they "embody basic human rights," in contrast to standards relating to
working time arrangements and minimum wage laws.64 In this and
related economic areas, different states of development of nation-
states and, equally important, the views of democratic institutions in
those countries about this matter, will be harmed by uniformity. And,
a view that these standards are procedural in nature leads to the idea
that they establish a framework for other labor standards that may be
either voluntarily negotiated by labor and management or devised
through government policy.
The OECD emphasizes its concern about uniformity by its distinc-
tion between core labor standards and other labor standards. The
60. OECD 2000, supra note 24, at 14 (arguing that because core and non-core labor
standards differ in the economic outcomes they produce, studies based on labor
standards generally cannot be easily compared to studies based on core labor
standards).
61. See generally Nancy H. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, The Adoption of International La-
bor Standards Conventions: Who, When and Why? (presented at Brookings Trade
Forum 2001), at httpJ/www.brook.edu/dybdocrootles/events/tradeforum200105/
papers/04_chaukanbur.pdf; Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and Interna-
tional Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in FAIR TRADE
AND HARMONIZATION PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 177, 177 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1997); Jonas Malmberg & David Johnson, So-
cial Clauses and Other Means to Promote Fair Labour Standards in International
Fora-A Survey, 25 ARBETSLIVSRAPPORT (1998).
62. See id. at 18, 20 (listing the fundamental principles and rights at work).
63. See id. (including eliminating child labor among the fundamental principles and
rights at work); see also OECD 1996, supra note 6, at 13. But, as we shall see, the
child labor issue carries with it special problems that bump up against economic
issues directly.
64. See OECD 2000, supra note 24, at 17.
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OECD finds this distinction to be "crucial" inasmuch as working time
and minimum wages can affect "patterns of comparative advantage,
e.g., higher minimum wages are likely to affect trade performance
negatively. But core labor standards, unlike minimum wages, will not
necessarily affect comparative advantage negatively, and indeed may
have a positive effect."65
Finally, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work unanimously adopted by the ILO in 1998, which expresses sup-
port on behalf of all members for the core standards, is acknowledge-
ment of the fact they are viewed to be of a fundamental nature and at
the center of a democratic society.66 The same holds true of the ILO
Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, which established special support
for the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining.6 7
The OECD found that there was no empirical evidence that low
core standards could be correlated with low real wage growth or that
raising core standards would imply a pattern of higher real wage
growth.68 In some countries where there is little or no freedom of as-
sociation there is no indication that real wages have grown faster than
productivity.6 9 Thus there appears to be no gain for developing coun-
tries that attempt to repress workers' rights in any of these areas and
thus involve such countries in an attempt to facilitate a "race to the
bottom."
Moreover, the 1996 OECD report found that a country's amount of
total country exports was not altered by improvement in the freedom
of association area.7 0 Moreover, a U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion report cited by the OECD supported the view that exporting sec-
tors in the developing countries have higher labor standards than
non-exporting sectors.71 Nonetheless, in five countries-Bangladesh,
Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Turkey-workers' rights have
65. See id. at 33. But see J. BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 71 (2002) (decrying the
selective use of core standards so as to disadvantage developing countries).
66. See Novotel N.Y., 321 N.L.R.B. 624 (1996) (stressing the connection between la-
bor rights and constitutional rights relating to freedom of expression protected by
the First Amendment).
67. See DECLARATION CONCERNING THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Art. 1I(e) (1944), at http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglishV
about/floconst.htm#annex (committing the ILO to "further world programmes
which will achieve... the effective recognition of the right of collective bargain-
ing, the cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of
productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in the prep-
aration and application of social and economic measures").
68. OECD 1996, supra note 7, at 37.
69. But see id. (noting that in Kuwait, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Turkey,
real wages have outpaced productivity gains).
70. Id. at 41.
71. See id. at 42, (citing U.S. International Trade Commission, International Trade
and the Role of Labor Standards, IN'L. ECON. REV. (1995)).
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been repressed in exporting zones in a way that was not the case of
the country generally.72
Of course, all that is reflected in the OECD report is a tendency-a
tendency which, while constituting the preponderance of evidence, is
by no means uniform. Nonetheless, the 1996 OECD report contains
this conclusion:
The "race to the bottom" view which argues that low standard countries will
enjoy gains in export market shares to the detriment of high standards coun-
tries appears to lack solid empirical support. Countries can only succeed in
repressing real wages and working conditions for a limited period of time.
Thereafter, market forces will be such that wages will catch-up, thus wiping
out previous competitive gains. More generally, there is evidence that, as ex-
pected, low per capita income countries have recorded significant improve-
ments in export market shares, suggesting market forces work in the
aggregate. 73
What about foreign direct investment in developing countries?
Will it not go to countries in which labor standards are inferior and
thus promote a "race to the bottom" in a less dramatic and more
drawn out fashion? Here again, the OECD is of the view that there is
no support for low core standards as a factor in trade and investment
decisions.74 This is because there is no evidence that low core stan-
dards are associated with low labor costs that are, in fact, principal
considerations in trade and investment. And, there is no evidence
that the ability to attract investment or even stimulate exports in ar-
eas where labor standards are low means that the long-term growth of
the country will be promoted. In essence, the OECD is of the view
that the enforcement of core standards may strengthen the economic
performance of developing countries. 75
Other findings of the OECD relate to the interplay between trade
liberalization and labor and the development of labor standards, par-
ticularly core standards. No single pattern of sequencing in terms of
trade liberalization and better compliance with Conventions 87 and 98
is demonstrated through OECD examination. That is to say, there is
no single pattern that determines whether free trade is likely to pro-
duce core labor standards or whether core labor standards as part of a
democratic system induce free trade.
But the OECD notes that freedom of association rights tended to
improve at least three years after the start of trade reforms in fifteen
countries and that in nine countries such rates preceded trade reforms
by at least three years.7 6 In eight countries the two processes begin at
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id. at 45.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 46 (arguing that "the enforcement of core standards is likely to strengthen
the long-term economic performance of all countries").
76. Id. at 49.
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the same time and in six countries there has been no improvement in
association rights.77 Thus, the OECD concludes that, on balance,
there is a "positive two-way relationship between these processes. In-
deed, a comprehensive policy and institutional reforms have been im-
plemented simultaneously in most of the liberalizing countries."78
Again, these conclusions do not seem to be consistent with the race
to the bottom idea. In no case was a worsening of freedom of associa-
tion rights found where trade reforms were instituted. And in no case
did the promotion of freedom of association and bargaining rights im-
pede trade liberalization.
Finally, in its 2000 report the OECD concluded that there was no
"robust evidence" that firms were directing investment to "no stan-
dards" countries.79 The OECD was of the view that countries in which
core labor standards were not respected received a very small share of
global investment. However, it was careful to note that there was a
"significant exception" to this conclusion in China.S0
It is still too early to say whether China's accession to the WTO
will alter this picture. China's proudly proclaimed resistance to the
development of independent unions in that country8l as well as its
forced labor violations induce us to approach that country's experience
and potential for altering what has been described above with some
caution. That, in itself, is an argument-or a portion of an argu-
ment-for some form of regulation.
Second, it is unclear what impact globalization has on health and
safety issues. It is interesting to note that neither the OECD nor the
ILO includes health and safety matters within the so-called "core"
principles. In a sense, this absence is justifiable because of the diffi-
culties invariably involved with defining the content. Yet the impor-
tance of heath and safety and its ability to be understood across
national boundaries means that it ought to get some kind of interna-
tional regulatory attention.8 2 Moreover, "[miorality sans borders"
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. OECD 2000, supra note 24, at 34.
80. Id.
81. See Erik Eckholm, Workers' Rights Are Suffering in China as Manufacturing
Goes Capitalist, N.Y. Tnms, Aug. 22, 2001, at A8 (chronicling the Chinese gov-
ernment's hostility to independent unions); see also Rahul Jacob, China's Workers
Unite in Anger, FiN. Tm is, May 27, 2002, at 7; Erik Eckholm, A Mining Town's
Sullen Peace Masks the Bitter Legacy of China's Labor Strategy, N.Y. Tnms, Apr.
14, 2002, at 6; Keith Bradsher, Factory Dispute Tests China's Loyalty to Workers'
Rights, N.Y. Tirs, July 18, 2002, at A3.
82. William B. Gould IV, The World's Workers May Yet Unite, L.A. Toms, Sept. 1,
1975. C.f William B. Gould IV, The Rights of Wage Earners: Of Human Rights
and International Labor Standards, 3 INDus. REL. L.J. 489 (1979); William B.
Gould IV, Multinational Corporations and Multinational Unions: Myths, Reality
and the Law, 10 INT'L- LAw. 655 (1976).
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cannot avert its gaze from admittedly complex and vexatious issues
like child labor about which there appears to be considerable consen-
sus.S3 The Woodrow Wilson-Jimmy Carter approach to international
human rights provides much of the justification for international reg-
ulation. The fact that some matters are difficult to resolve does not
argue against international regulation.
Third, the burden of competition appears to fall disproportionately
upon the unionized sector of the industrially advanced economies.
The difficulties in the United States in terms of both low wages as well
as unemployment have disproportionately affected the bastions of
union strength like manufacturing and textiles. The causes are far
more complex than globalization. Yet the decline of trade unionism is
a worrisome phenomenon that a democratic pluralistic society can ill
afford. Again, this erosion of the important elements of the demo-
cratic state argues for international regulation of some kind.
III. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Of course, many argue that the answer to this question is abso-
lutely nothing. Professor Jagdish Bhagwati and others champion this
view 4-at least when it comes to linkage between trade and labor.8 5
Their first argument lies in their contentions that there is no causal
link between globalization and inequality and unemployment. Their
view is that if imports were undercutting the unionized sector, we
would see a resulting decrease in prices of such goods. Yet this phe-
nomenon has not occurred. The response put forward by, for instance,
Adrian Wood is that the decimation of entire industries like textiles 86
has emerged and that, in any event, technology-the other major cul-
prit in this story-is in part promoted by trade.8 7 Technology, it is
argued, is a response to trade and is often introduced through foreign
competition itself, Japan being a vivid illustration.
In any event, the argument of Bhagwati and others is that the idea
of international labor standards is essentially protectionist and thus
akin to other straightforward protectionist arguments proffered on be-
half of industries that are harmed by foreign competition and global-
ization. This argument will gain strength in the wake of the Bush
Administration's tariff increases in the steel industry which, rather
83. BHAGWATI, supra note 65, at 68.
84. See, e.g., J. Bhagwati, A View from Academia, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STAN-
DARDS AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM (G. Schoepfle &
K. Swinnerton eds., 1994).
85. BHAGWATI, supra note 65, at 79-80.
86. Since 1997, the United States has lost 180,000 jobs in textiles. Last year 116
plants closed. Free Trade Tangled up in Textiles, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 2002 at
25.
87. ADRIAN WOOD, NORTH-SOUTH TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND INEQUALITY: CHANGING
FORTUNES IN A SKILL-DRIVEN WORLD (1994).
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than protect the most vulnerable workers, are designed to diminish
peril for uncompetitive industry.SS Even before the steel debacle the
same Administration sacrificed free trade at the altar of the textile
industry in order to get the Trade Promotion Act-supposedly a free
trade measure-through the House of Representatives.8 9
From this analogy, the Bhagwati group concludes that interna-
tional labor standards with teeth must be rejected. If, runs the argu-
ment, the industrialized countries were truly concerned about the
plight of foreign workers and seeking to have them benefit through
the development of such standards, they would provide more adequate
foreign assistance. Yet, as we have seen, foreign assistance has di-
minished, particularly in the United States, reflecting a lack of genu-
ine concern for foreign workers.
Second, it is argued that the fact that immigrant workers are rou-
tinely denied visas is another example of protectionism. If the U.S.
truly desires to benefit foreign workers, the argument goes, then why
not allow them entry to the United States so that they can enjoy the
labor standards of this country? The large influx of illegal or undocu-
mented workers is indicative of both the employers' demand for labor
and the employees' demand for jobs. The exploitation of undocu-
mented workers is unremedied by labor law coverage 9O-a point
dramatized by the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision to deny undocu-
mented workers back pay remedies under the NLRA.91 This ruling
which creates an incentive for American employers to employ workers
to whom labor law protection is denied constitutes a compelling argu-
ment in favor of the proposition that the West, and particularly the
United States, is not concerned with the plight of vulnerable immi-
grant workers who hail from the poor nations but rather the interests
of entrepreneurs within our own borders.92
88. See supra note 11 for articles dealing with the increased tariffs in the steel
industry.
89. See The High Price of Fast-track, FIN. Thms (London), Dec. 17, 2001, at 14.
90. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
91. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275 (2002). The Court's
statement that it was attempting to enforce immigration law is undercut by vir-
tue of the fact that immigration law is not being enforced in any event. See Louis
Uchitelle, I.N.S. Is Looking the Other Way as Illegal Immigrants Fill Jobs: En-
forcement Changes in Face of Labor Shortage, N.Y. Trms, Mar. 9, 2000, at Al,
A14. The position of the dissenters was first articulated by my NLRB in APRA
Fuel Oil Buyers Group Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995), enforcement granted, NLRB
v. APRA Fuel Oil Buyers' Group, 134 F.3d 50 (1997). For some of the institu-
tional and political limitations and pressures presented by this issue for the
NLRB, see Wni..Ax B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAw, PoLITIcs, AND THE
NLRB-A MEMoIR 134, 182 (2000).
92. Ruling Makes Immigrant Abuse More Likely: Justices' 5-4 Decision Sets Back Ef-
forts to Unionize Undocumented Workers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 29,
2002, at 10B.
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Third, opponents of international labor standards note that the
United States has not ratified any of the core conventions except for
the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention of 1999 as well as Con-
vention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor, ratified belatedly in
1991.93 Even the fundamental Conventions providing the principles
and standards of freedom of association and collective bargaining have
not been ratified by the United States in part, because of the argu-
ment that is a federalist country where our national government
would have difficultly committing itself to such standards.94 At the
same time, it can be argued that this policy constitutes indifference to
all workers by American governments, Americans as well as foreign-
ers, and that therefore job protectionism is not present.95
And fourth, the opponents of standards note that the United States
has done a poor job of protecting the oppressed within its own borders.
For instance, agricultural workers are beyond the protections of the
National Labor Relations Act.96 This policy is the mirror image of
American treatment of undocumented workers. Thus in many in-
stances protection is not afforded to the most vulnerable among us
here. The United States has been resistant to the idea that interna-
tional human rights-labor standards ought to be used to raise up
workers who are oppressed in the United States.97 Again, however,
the evidence thus far seems to support policies which are indifferent to
workers both in the United States and abroad.
What policies should be pursued within our own borders to address
and assuage the concerns and difficulties of American workers and, in
93. OECD 2000, supra note 24, at 22-23.
94. Yet there is something more involved in this story since federalist countries other
than the United States have a demonstrably superior record in ratifying ILO
Conventions. Id. at 21 (noting that nations with federal forms of government,
such as the United States and Switzerland, may be limited in their abilities to
bind their states as a result of the decentralization of political authority). Al-
though this 'federalism prevents passage of fundamental standards" argument
makes sense, comparing the performance of different federalist nations demon-
strates that some other factors must be at work. Canada has ratified four of the
ILO's seven fundamental conventions; Australia has ratified six; and Switzerland
has ratified all seven. Id. at 25. If it were the case that federalism were the
determinant factor, then one would expect these nations' totals to be closer to the
United States' measly total of two.
95. I am indebted to Professor Brian Bercusson for making this point to me.
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) ("The term "employee" . . . shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer .... ."). The Supreme Court has
rejected the view that the statutory exclusion of agricultural workers represents
an unconstitutional denial of the right to organize. Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). For a contrasting view under Cana-
dian law, see Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 2001 S.C.C. 94 (2001).
97. James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations
Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL. J. 65 (1999).
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so doing, to diminish protectionist instincts such as those which have
emerged in the steel industry in 2002? Little attention has been given
to this problem.
The fact of the matter is that trade is a game of winners and losers
and the United States has done little to help the losers. In 2000, Sen-
ator Bill Bradley advocated protection for workers displaced by trade
agreements through a new earnings insurance program that would
give them time to learn new skills and develop new careers. Such a
program would allow employees to take a job at a lower salary and the
government would reimburse half the lost wages for the next three
years. This would not extend or constitute unemployment compensa-
tion but would provide workers with time to develop new skills that
would allow them to advance their new job and new career.9 8 Senator
Bradley was not elected and the legislation was not enacted. It seems
clear that at this point there is no political will to provide substantial
tax money for this important policy objective. Even more modest
Democratic Party attempts to expand adjustment assistance to work-
ers secondarily affected by trade has met with Bush White House
resistance. 99
The 2002 steel industry debate resulted in increased tariffs-but
not governmental assistance to protect workers' pensions and health
care which are threatened by dislocation. National labor policy must
focus upon protecting workers in transition who are in industries that
lack a comparative advantage and who will lose income, health bene-
fits, and pensions-not industries that cannot compete in world mar-
ket. Thus I enthusiastically concur with the following view:
[W]ith the wealth generated by free trade, society can provide transfers to
people with less income, including those for whom trade provides no advan-
tage or even a net disadvantage. For example, instead of pressuring the Japa-
nese automobile industry to adopt voluntary export restraints in the 1980s,
the United States could have paid cash compensation to American
autoworkers. This strategy would have cost far less than the $3 billion that
American consumers ultimately spent in higher car prices.1 0 0
Since the consumers win from free trade, it is appropriate that part
of their winnings go to the free trade losers. Additionally, there will
be ongoing debate about whether the trade adjustment assistance pro-
gram, which has promoted assistance including benefits, relocation
98. See Bob Davis, Bradley to Propose Plan for Laid-Off Workers, WALL ST. J., Feb.
23, 2000, at A2, A8; David Wessel, Trade Balance: Tipping Scales to Help Work-
ers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2001, at Al (arguing in support of "wage insurance" to
support employees who lose their jobs due to foreign trade).
99. Free Trade Tangled Up in Textiles, supra note 86; Lael Brainard, Textiles and
Terrorism, N.Y. TamEs, Dec. 27, 2001, at A19. Compare the Swedish approach in
Nicholas George, Swedish Union Body Wants 'Buffer Fund', FIN. Tnis (London),
Mar. 3, 2002, at 4.
100. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 6, at 525 (footnotes omitted).
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expenses and training-should be strengthened so as to facilitate eli-
gibility for benefits.1Oi
In any event, that debate about legislation relates to a law that
provides benefits alone and not, as advocated by Senator Bradley, ben-
efits alongside of new jobs. A central element of the industrialized
world's policies must be to provide income assistance along with jobs.
As the London Economist has noted in criticizing the steel tariff.
[T[he principle should be 'protect the worker, not the industry.' The govern-
ment should improve its assistance programmes for workers who lose their
health-care benefits and pensions when firms fail, and it should look at new
and more generous ways of helping workers find new jobs. These policies cost
money, of course-but so does shutting out imports, and far more so, the only
other difference being that the effect is disguised. 1 0 2
Beyond this approach, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has ad-
vocated reforming the National Labor Relations Act as a way to move
toward the acceptance of trade and a form of labor standards in our
own country.1 0 3 The idea is that unions which have a fair shot of or-
ganizing new employees in industries that grow as a result of free
trade will find less to resist in globalization itself. But even before the
intensified debate about international labor standards, it was clear
that enactment of any revisions of the National Labor Relations Act
had no chance whatsoever, even with a Democratic Congress (let alone
with a Republican-controlled House, which has been the case since
1994).
Even if the needy rich have laid first claim on the United States
Treasury and thus the realization of proposals propounded by Senator
Bradley and labor law reform are not even remotely possible, the
question still arises as to whether some the problems at which an in-
ternational framework is aimed could be remedied by existing na-
tional labor law in a sovereign state like the United States. Solidarity
between unions across bargaining units and other arbitrary boundary
lines is unusual-particularly in the form of secondary boycotts-and
the law allowing for international secondary activity in the United
States is murky.1 0 4 Similarly, the duty to bargain with unions about
corporate relocations across boundaries affords little basis for Ameri-
can unions to ascertain the actual grounds on which management's
101. J.F. Hornbeck, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms: Economic, Program, and
Policy Issues, CRS REPORT RS20210, July 2, 2001; Ethan Kapstein, Trade Liber-
alization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment Assistance, 137 INTr'L LAB. REv.
501(1998).
102. Tariffs on Steel: George Bush, Protectionist-The President's Decision to Place
High Tariffs on Imports of Steel Is Disgraceful, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2002, at 13.
103. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs; America's Labor Pains, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 9, 2000, at A25.
104. Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, 323 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1034 (1997) (Chairman Gould,
dissenting), on remand from Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 56
F.3d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996).
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decision has been taken. 0 5 Employer decisions to relocate because of
union activity are unlawful, but the applicability of this proposition is
limited by the need to prove actual anti-union animusl0 6 or to get the
Board to use expedited procedures available under Section 10(j) of
Act.107
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Labor Union of
Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc.i08 has made clear, it will be
difficult for American courts to exercise jurisdiction over labor dis-
putes beyond our borders.109 My dissenting opinion in International
Longshoreman's Associationi'O would have expanded jurisdiction
under the National Labor Relations Act, but at this point it is just
that-a dissent! If answers to the question of whether and what inter-
national labor standards should be promoted are to be found, one
must look beyond national labor law in the United States and, in all
probability, throughout the industrialized world.
What then should or needs to be done beyond efforts to cushion the
blows of trade for domestic workers inside America's borders? The
fact that there are outlier countries in which the "race to the bottom"
does take place and that there is so little known about what will con-
stitute China's response to free trade, that the race may well affect
aspects of health and safety, along with the intrinsic value of interna-
tional labor standards or rights as a matter of both decency and dig-
nity and as an important factor in democracy and world peace, all
could argue for some form of protection which is not protectionism.
Freedom of association and collective bargaining are the bedrock of
international labor standards as human rights. Beyond the concerns
expressed previously relating to trade, these rights are part of the so
called public goods which workers are unlikely to obtain on an individ-
ual basis but can do so collectively through trade union representa-
tion.' 1 ' Second, it seems apparent that unions are part of the
105. First Nat'1 Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Q-1 Motor Express, 323
N.L.R.B. 767, 769 (1997) (Chairman Gould, concurring).
106. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
107. Aguayo v. Quadratech Corp., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
108. Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992).
109. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is different in explicitly establishing extraterritorial
jurisdiction in connection with that statute. See William B. Gould IV, The Law
and Politics of Race: The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 44 LABOR L.J. 323 (1993); Wil-
liam B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in
1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TuL. L. Ray. 1485 (1990).
Congress there reversed EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
110. See cases cited supra note 104. C.f Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Intl
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982); Longshoremen ILA v. Allied Intl,
456 U.S. 212 (1982); MuCulloh v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10 (1963).
111. See generally RicHAP B. FREEMAN & JAmEs L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
(1984).
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democratic pluralist society in which workers are able to voice their
views alongside of business interests. True, the United States and, to
a lesser extent, the West is sometimes inconsistent in its promotion of
such policies within the industrialized world. But they must be pur-
sued throughout the world.
Third, anti-discrimination principles, particularly where the ques-
tion of equal pay for equally valued work is skirted-it remains a
thorny problem in the United States itselfli2 -is the second obvious
candidate. Just as they do with substantive conditions of employment
like minimum wage and overtime, developing countries may maintain
that freedom of association and collective bargaining are inappropri-
ate to them at their stage of economic development. Is it possible to
make the same claim in connection with discrimination on the basis
of, for instance, sex or race or some other arbitrary consideration? My
sense is that a broad consensus cutting across national boundaries an-
swers this question in the negative.' 1 3
But beyond freedom of association, collective bargaining and anti-
discrimination, the list becomes more complicated. Forced labor is
surely the next obvious candidate. The forced labor prohibitions are
very much akin to antislavery policies.114 It is difficult to quarrel
with the idea that these kinds of standards, whether the race to the
bottom is involved or not, can be tolerated in civilized societies in the
twenty-first century.
Yet problems arise in United States in connection with prison
labor. Some states in this country allow prison work to be sub-
contracted to private companies.' 1 5 That practice appears to run
112. The debate surrounding pay equity/comparable worth in the United States is evi-
dence of the thorniness of this issue. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther,
452 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1981); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1985). C.f William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment
Docket in the October 1980 Term: Justice Brennan's Term, 53 U. COLO. L. Rav. 1,
63-74 (1981). For a review of the United States' experience with pay equity, see
M. Neil Browne & Michael D. Meuti, Individualism and the Market Determina-
tion of Women's Wages in the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong, 21 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 355, 365-72 (1999).
113. Thus I am skeptical about the Bhagwati argument that gender discrimination
will not be fast-tracked as a core standard. BHAGWATI, supra note 65, at 71.
114. See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Com-
merce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-
1957, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2002); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of
Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997).
115. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS oF
FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABoUR 59 (2001), at http'//www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/decl/publ/reports/index.htm; Jonathan M. Cowen, One Nation's "Gu-
lag" is Another Nation's Factory Within a Fence: Prison Labor in the People's Re-
public of China and the United States of America, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 190,
201-03 (1993) (briefly reviewing the states' laws on contracting out prison labor).
Cowen notes that in the nineteenth century and through 1929, the practice of
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afoul of the relevant ILO convention and makes consensus more
difficult.116
But the most troublesome of all of the core labor standards and
that which appears to be most heinous and attracts consequent unfa-
vorable publicity for American and other Western multinationals is
child labor itself. As the OECD has said with regard to the law and
child labor:
[Ilt is unlikely that the low legal provisions are the main factor behind child
labour. Instead, it is the lack of enforcement of the existing provisions (how-
ever low) which poses the major problem. Enforcement is typically weak in
the informal sector. In several countries, the under-provision of schools
makes enforcement of child labour laws problematic. This is especially the
case in rural areas of Brazil, India and Turkey. More generally, in the face of
very low living standards, child labour provides an important source of income
to their families.1 1 7
This means that attempts to remedy child labor and the way in
which it stunts educational growth and opportunity lie in more assis-
tance to affected people rather than in flat prohibitions. Income de-
cline visited upon impoverished families place them in desperate
circumstances. 138 They must be recompensed for the loss involved.
The institution reviewing child labor disputes must be able to order or
effectively promote assistance as a necessary complement to any
prohibition.
Again, the richest countries will be required to provide the assis-
tance. The imposition of child labor requirements without assistance
will simply push children away from export industries for instance,
and into the area of pornography and sexual exploitation.
In 1999 the ILO members unanimously adopted the Worst Forms
of Child Labor Convention, Convention 182. Even the United States
ratified this one. Convention 182 specifically bans all forms of slavery
or practices akin to slavery, forced or compulsory labor, sexual ex-
ploitation, illicit activities and other forms of work relating to children
that will harm their health, safety and morals. It would be a mistake
for anyone to believe that this broadly accepted convention addresses
the more fundamental problem of child labor-nor does the ILO Con-
states' permitting private enterprises to operate factories in their prisons was
common. Id. at 201. Since 1979, this practice has again come into fashion. Id. at
202. See also OECD 1996, supra note 7, at 34.
116. See OECD 1996, supra note 7, at 32 (noting that the ILO's Convention 29 prohib-
its prison labor performed for private agents). Interestingly, to the extent that
prison labor is performed 'in the interest of the community when there is immi-
nent necessity," it does not violate Convention 29. Id.
117. OECD 1996, supra note 6, at 28.
118. Kaushik Basu, Compacts, Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives for Higher Interna-
tional Labor Standards, 34 CoREzu I NrL L.J. 487, 490-496 (2001); Drusilla K.
Brown, Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade
Agenda? (Tufts University Economics Working Paper Series No. 2001-13), at
http'J/ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/200113.pdf.
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vention which prohibits the employment of minors below a particular
age. 119 Again, the broader problem can be addressed only with finan-
cial assistance that compensates families which are on the edge of eco-
nomic devastation.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE FORUM
But if there are standards that should exist internationally, the
question is how to bring about adherence or enforcement. As noted
above, the International Labor Organization has been the principal
forum historically. The ILO utilizes a variety of means to monitor ap-
plication or observance of its conventions. The first is the regular sys-
tem of supervision based on the ratification of conventions by ILO
member countries. The ILO, tripartite in organization, allows for any
employer or workers' organization to seek an examination of a govern-
ment's alleged failure to apply a convention that it has ratified. Gov-
ernments may also bring complaints or concerns against other
governments and special machinery is established to address freedom
of association complaints from workers' organizations or employers
against governments which have not ratified Conventions 87 and 98
relating to freedom of association, the right to organize, and collective
bargaining. And special machinery may be established for reporting
purposes relating to labor standards issues-a good illustration of this
is the special machinery established to report on apartheid in South
Africa. Attempts to extend the freedom of association machinery to
other core conventions such as forced labor and non-discrimination
have been rejected because those conventions are not embedded in the
ILO Constitution as is true of Conventions 87 and 98. The problem
here is to assure applicability of the machinery to non-ratifying
countries.
As noted above, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, promulgated in 1998, attempts to promote obser-
vance of the core standards for countries which are members of the
organization whether the convention has been ratified by the country
119. Convention 138, passed in 1973, requires each member nation to establish a min-
imum age for workers. That age should be at "a level consistent with the fullest
physical and mental development of young persons," ILO CoNvTrrIoN No. 138,
art. I, at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C138, and no lower than fif-
teen, id. at art. II., § 3. The Convention further establishes that the minimum
age in jobs "likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young persons"
should be eighteen. Id. at art. III, § 1. These provisions notwithstanding, Con-
vention No. 138 states that member nations may permit children between the
ages of thirteen and fifteen to perform work that is "not likely to be harmful to
their health or development" and "not such as to prejudice their attendance at
school, their participation in vocational orientation or training programmes ap-
proved by the competent authority or their capacity to benefit from the instruc-
tion received." Id. at art. VII, § 1.
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in question or not.120 Yet, despite the potential of a resort to the In-
ternational Court of Justice in Hague pursuant to in ILO Article 33,
the fact of the matter is that it has not been tried even in the more
notorious cases of South Africa, when apartheid prevailed, or My-
anmar, where there were numerous problems with forced labor viola-
tions. Although it is an exaggeration to characterize the ILO as a
debating society, it has at its disposal no meaningful remedies and
sanctions beyond the potential for the offending country to be casti-
gated and chastised in the court of international public opinion.12 1
Nonetheless Professor Bhagwati, and much of the business com-
munity, believe that the ILO is the best agency. States Bhagwati:
So the common argument that ILO has no teeth, that is, no trade sanctions, is
wrong. I would argue that God gave us just not teeth but also a tongue; and a
good tongue-lashing, based on evaluations that are credible, impartial and un-
biased, can push a country into better policies through shame, guilt and the
activities of NGOs that act on such findings. 12 2
This view appears to be predicated upon two general considerations.
The first is that the ILO possesses the expertise and has more staff
than comparable organizations like the World Trade Organization
which possesses trade sanctions remedies. The ILO is the appropriate
agency though its "staff and structure need improvement.123
Bhagwati points out that only 5 percent of the output produced by
children enters foreign markets and notes that a broad prohibition
against child labor could push children into prostitution. But it is un-
clear why the ILO or any other agency which possessed effective reme-
dies could not address these issues. Similarly, his point that the
United States is not itself in compliance with the fundamental core
standards does not seem to undercut the idea firm remedies should be
applied against both industrialized and developing countries.
Admittedly, Bhagwati's point about the ILO possessing the exper-
tise and experience is well taken. But this begs the issue of whether
any agency should have strong sanctions or remedies. The attractive-
ness of the ILO appears to lie in the fact that it not only possesses
expertise but also a tongue rather than a tooth.
The ILO has experience with the promotion of anti-child labor poli-
cies coupled with financial assistance to affected families.12 4 Its re-
120. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 3(b), at
http://www.ilo.orgpublic/english/standards/dec]Ideclaration/text/index.htm.
121. But see Elizabeth Olson, I.L.O., Long in Eclipse, Regains Some Prominence, N.Y.
Tnmus, Mar. 23, 2000, at C4; The Collapse in Seattle, N.Y. Tn~ms, Dec. 6, 1999, at
A28.
122. BHAGWATI, supra note 65, at 79.
123. Id. at 73.
124. The connection between effective child labor policies and cash assistance is clear
from the ILO experience itself. See, e.g., Christian von Mitzlaff, ILO Technical
Paper 1: Monitoring and Verification Systems in Garment Factories and the
Placement of Child Workers in Education Programmes (presented at ILO/Japan
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structuring must give it the authority of a world tribunal1 25 with
meaningful remedies including the potential for sanctions as a last
resort.126
A second potential forum for this issue is the World Trade Organi-
zation whose 1999 meeting in Seattle prompted protests by various
groups and organizations. The WTO's dispute resolution machinery
can culminate in sanctions for violations of GATT. But, generally
speaking, its jurisdiction does not attach to labor matters. Only where
prison labor is involved does any provision of GATT become applicable
to the WTO and its jurisdiction.12 7
Asian Regional Meeting on Monitoring Child Labour at the Workplace, Dhaka,
Bangladesh (October 24-26, 2000)), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/
asrolbangkoklpaper/dhaka/tpaperl.pdf (noting that the "provision of an instant
income loss alternative is crucial for the ex-child worker to accept social assis-
tance by the project"). The same document points out that "lack of funds forced
the project management to halt stipend payment twice. Part of the dropout is
related to this interruption of payment." Id. All too frequently the essential cash
payments are miniscule or lacking. See generally INTL LABoUR OFFICE, INTL
PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, IPEC ACTION AGAINST CHILD
LABoUR 2000-2001: PROGRESS AND FUTURE PRIORITIES (2002), at httpi/
www.ilo.org/public/englisb/standards/ipec/about/implementation/ipecreport.pfdf
INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, INT'L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR,
IPEC HIGHLIGHTS 2000 (2000), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
ipec/publ/imprep99/report2000/draft7.htm; INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, INT'L PRO-
GRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, ILO-EPEC HIGHLIGHTS OF 1998
(1998), at http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglish/standards/ipec/publ/policy/high-98/in-
dex.htm. The attendance of children in the schools apparently due to inadequate
cash payments is set forth in The Invisible Children, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at
1. See also Juan Forero, In Ecuador's Banana Fields, Child Labor Is Key to Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at Al, A6.
125. Former NLRB Chairman Reflects on Freedom of Association as ILO Celebrates
Major Milestones, 12 ILo Focus (1999) (interview with William B. Gould IV), at
http://us.ilo.org/news/focus/991/FOCUS-4.htm.
126. My assistant Sarah Preston points out to me that trade sanctions could operate
unevenly and harm the interests of developing countries which do not have re-
sources or economic power comparable to the industrialized world. Assuming ar-
guendo the accuracy of this point, this strengthens support for other remedies
such as fines which can transcend national boundaries.
127. Article XX(e) of GATT provides,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures:
(e) relating to products of prison labor.
GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1887, quoted in Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanc-
tions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Ad-
dition to the World Trade Organization, 11 Am. U.J. INTL. L. & PoL'Y 1, 36 (1996).
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As the Seattle fracas demonstrated, when President Clinton spoke
of labor standards or workers rights in the context of trade sanctions
and the United States renewed proposals for an ILO-WTO working
party on the subject, there is rigid resistance to bringing this matter
within the WTO's jurisdiction on the part of the developing coun-
tries.128 Those who hold this view frequently note that the ILO is the
expert agency in the area of core standards and other labor issues.
But, as noted, the conundrum is that the ILO has no sanctions and
that, while the WTO does, there is no consensus supporting the view
that the WTO should move in a direction which applies its mecha-
nisms to unfair labor practices or trade practices which involve labor
components. Indeed, in Seattle the idea of establishing working
groups involving the ILO and the WTO or other international agencies
reviewing the relationship between labor standards and a trading sys-
tem was rejected. In Doha in 2001 the labor issue was not even on the
table at the most recent WTO meeting.129
Are there other more suitable fora for resolving such matters?
This is the most fruitful arena for the establishment and promotion of
international labor standards. At the front line of activity are regional
agreements or treaties, unilateral government actions and litigation
about such as well as corporate codes of conduct.
Regional treaties have seen a great deal of activity and it may be
that this is where most of the developments will take place. As has
been noted:
Because the citizens of nations in a particular region are more likely to have
similar preferences, resources, political values, and economic systems, it may
be easier for them to reach effective and enforceable regional agreements. Af-
ter nations have already formed such smaller compacts, it may be easier for
them to move to a global agreement. 130
These more limited first steps may make it possible to take into ac-
count the idiosyncratic expectations of different nation-states.'13 Not-
withstanding the fact that such instruments create trade barriers for
non-signatories, they may constitute the first step toward interna-
128. See Steven Greenhouse & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Effort to Add Labor Standards to
Agenda Fails, N.Y. Tims, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al; Guy De Jonquieres, Clinton's De-
mands Threaten Turmoil at Seattle Talks: Call for Sanctions to Enforce Trade
Links to Labour Standards, FiN. Tnms (London), Dec. 2, 1999, at 1; Joseph Kahn
& David E. Sanger, Impasse on Trade Delivers Stinging Blow to Clinton, N.Y.
TnAEs, Dec. 4, 1999, at Al; David E. Sanger, President Chides World Trade Body
in Stormy Seattle, N.Y. Tniss, Dec. 2, 1999, at Al, A14; Richard W. Stevenson,
Clinton Defends His Role at the Seattle Trade Talks, N.Y. TnEs, Dec. 9, 1999, at
A12.
129. See Louis Uchitelle, Challenging the Dogmas of Free Trade, N.Y. Tmas, Feb. 9,
2002, at B7.
130. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 6, at 564-565 (footnotes omitted).
131. Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl Wu Dunn, Two Cheers for Sweatshops, N.Y. TMEs
MAG., Sept. 24, 2001 at 70.
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tional labor standards contained in legal agreements. At least in the
short run full blown international instruments relating to labor are
perhaps excessively ambitious.
The most widely discussed regional agreement is the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which promotes enforcement of
existing labor laws between the three member countries, the United
States, Canada and Mexico. The problem with NAFTA is that only
existing standards are protected and then, in the case of core stan-
dards, no remedy beyond Ministerial consultations exists.
This first effort in this arena was enacted in 1993, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1994. President Clinton had campaigned in 1992 against the
NAFTA proposed by he Bush Administration on the grounds that it
did not include a labor accord or labor provisions which would take
into account worker rights. The NAFTA which became effective con-
tained the first ever labor side agreement attached to a trade
agreement. 132
The NAFTA creates three categories of worker rights, one category
that is enforceable through the dispute resolution mechanism, culmi-
nating in sanctions, and the others not.133 The provisions that are
ultimately enforceable by sanctions are those that prohibit child labor,
establish minimum employment standards pertaining to minimum
wages and promote the prevention of occupational injuries and ill-
nesses. Core standards are remitted to a different mechanism. In the
case of freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, and the right to strike, all such matters are heard by National
Administrative Offices established in each country and, the final step
in the process is Ministerial discussion between the United States'
Secretary of Labor and the Ministers of Labor in Canada and Mexico.
Other core standards like the prohibition of forced labor, the elimi-
nation of employment discrimination, and equal pay for men and wo-
men are handled by an Evaluation Committee of Experts, and as is
the case with the other core standards, no sanctions apply.
The NAFTA obliges all three signatory nations to enforce their own
domestic laws. But, as the American experience itself demon-
strates,134 domestic law is frequently inadequate or lacking in promot-
ing the broad principles which are set forth in the NAFTA itself. And
132. For discussion of a wide variety of instruments containing labor clauses, see
Brian Bercusson, Labour Regulation in a Transnational Economy, 6 MAASTRICHT
J. OF EuR. AND COMP. L. 244.
133. The mechanisms are described in more detail in M. J. Bolle, NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate, CRS REPORT
97-861 (Jan. 11, 2002).
134. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAw (1993); LANCE A. COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORK-
ERs' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (2000).
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even where the National Labor Relations Board finds violations of the
Act, a court of appeals may reverse the finding through its own inter-
pretation of both fact and law. This happened in the celebrated Sprint
case 3 5 in which complaints were filed by the Mexican government.136
Moreover, the NAFTA procedures themselves have been convoluted
and, as noted, there are no sanctions at the end of the road.137
Nonetheless, a number of accomplishments are associated with the
NAFTA. First, as noted above, it is the first trade agreement to pro-
vide for labor rights. Just as the National Labor Relations Act con-
tains a bill of rights for workers which has existed ever since 1935, an
important principle has been established, notwithstanding the ineffec-
tiveness of remedies.
Second, it seems clear that Mexico has become more democratic
since the NAFTA has been in existence. Indeed the Supreme Court of
Mexico has held Mexican labor law, which reserves representation in
a firm to one union, to be unconstitutional in that country. New and
more democratic unions seem to have been set in place as the result of
this process.
Third, the dispute resolution procedures of the NAFTA are open
and, in contrast to the WTO, the sunshine seems to have enhanced
reforms. All three countries seem to have become more aware of their
respective labor laws as the result of the NAFTA.
But the most important feature of the NAFTA was that its labor
accord, notwithstanding its imperfection, might serve as a basis for a
better mechanism in the future. Already the dialogue has progressed
substantially beyond that which transpired in the early '90s at the
time of the major NAFTA debate.
Now the debate about whether labor should be part of the trade
equation has emerged dramatically within the context of legislation
designed to extend or revive the president's authority to negotiate
such treaties on a so-called "fast-track" basis. This authority expired
with the expiration of the Ominbus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988. The theory has been that the United States would be at a disad-
vantage in negotiating foreign trade agreements with other countries
if those countries believed that Congress could later interfere with a
negotiated agreement. The result would be either no deal at all or a
135. LCF, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 774 (1996), enforcement denied, 129 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
136. NATL ADMIN. OFFICE OF MEXICO FOR N. Ai. AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION,
REPORT ON REVIEW OF PUBLIC SUBMISSION 9501/NAO (1995) (Staff translation).
C.f Sarah Lowe, The First American Case Under the North American Agreement
for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAmi L. REv. 481 (1997).
137. Clyde Summers, Nafta's Labor Side Agreement and International Labor Stan-
dards, 3 J. SmALi & EMERGING Bus. L. 173 (1999). See generally Henry H. Drum-
monds, Transnational Small and Emerging Business in a World of Nikes and
Microsofts, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 249 (2000).
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deal which would more likely reflect something short of the other
country's final or best offer.
Both the 104th and the 105th Congresses considered, but failed to
enact, renewed fast-track authority for the president which would pro-
hibit congressional amendments of a negotiated trade agreement and
provide for limited debate. The fall of 1997 was to see this issue at
impasse with the Congressional Democrats unwilling to support Pres-
ident Clinton's sought after fast-track authority,138 though a substan-
tial number of Republicans were perfectly delighted to harm the
Clinton presidency.
Thomas Friedman summed up the debate well when he said that a
kind of four party system had emerged on this matter. It could be said
that integrationists promoting globalization, noted Friedman, were on
one side of an east-west line and that separatists who believed that
neither free trade nor technological integration was good or inevitable
were on the other side. But, Friedman noted that another line from
north to south was relevant to the globalization debate. This was the
so-called "distribution line" which was concerned with cushioning
workers from social, economic and environmental impacts of global-
ization. Some like the "Integrationist-Social-Safety-Netters" were
concerned with assisting the know-nots and have-nots who lacked the
skills to take advantage of the new economy and were unemployed
and driven into poor jobs as a result. At the other end of this distribu-
tion line were the "Let-Them-Eat-Cakers" or those who like Speaker
Newt Gingrich and the Republican right wing in the Congress be-
lieved in a "winner-take-all, loser-take-care-of-yourself' economy.
Said Friedman:
You have to build a real politics of Integrationist-Social-Safety-Nettism-a
politics that show people the power and potential of global integration, while
taking seriously their needs for safety nets to protect them along the way.
Build it and they will come.139
Notwithstanding the expiration of fast-track authority and Presi-
dent Clinton's inability to obtain approval from the Republican Con-
gresses with which fate consigned him to deal, the Administration
negotiated a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. 140 This agreement,
rather than simply constituting an accord or side agreement as was
138. See JOE KLEIN, THE NATURAL: THE MISUNDERSTOOD PRESIDENCY OF BILL CLINTON
16 (2002).
139. Thomas L. Friedman, The New American Politics, N.Y. Tzms, Nov. 13, 1997.
140. See Joseph Kahn, Labor Praises New Trade Pact with Jordan, N.Y. TmEs, Oct.
25, 2000, at C1, C12. For a discussion of this agreement during the Bush Admin-
istration, see David Armstrong, U.S., Jordan Expand Economic Ties, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 10, 2001, at B1, B2; Marc Lacey, Bush Seeking to Modify Pact on
Trade with Jordan, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 11, 2001, at A5; Richard W. Stevenson, Sen-
ate Approves Bill to Lift Barriers to Trade with Jordan, N.Y. TneEs, Sept. 25,
2001, at C1, 06.
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the case with the NAFTA, contained labor provisions in the body of
the agreement itself, occupying one page of the text. Moreover, the
labor laws which were to be respected were not only each countries'
own-enforcement being required through a dispute resolution mech-
anism-but also "internationally recognized worker rights" and "core
labor standards" as defined by the International Labor Organization.
This time, in contrast to the NAFTA, the dispute resolution proce-
dures obliged parties to take "appropriate and commensurate" mea-
sures at the processes culmination. The Jordan Agreement provided a
kind of backdrop for debate about the renewal of fast-track or, as it
came to be called during the Bush Administration in 2001 and 2002,
trade promotion authority.
Now the debate has become more complex. The Bush Administra-
tion proposed a so-called "toolbox" of actions, which could be taken in
trade negotiations, one of which would relate to the protection of chil-
dren and adherence to core labor standards in connection with inter-
national trade.
Some of the New Democrats, led by Congressman Cal Dooley of
California, lauded Bush but expressed a concern that no appropriate
mechanisms for the enforcement of trade agreements were provided
by the Bush proposals. 141 The overwhelming number of Old and New
Democrats opposed the Bush initiative. In a widely discussed and
heralded vote in late '01, the House of Representatives passed a Re-
publican bill supported by a handful of Democrats such as Dooley, Jef-
ferson, and Tanner by a vote of 215 to 214. Yet the major defect in this
bill, HR 3005, relates to the vagueness of the content of future trade
agreements as they relate to labor issues. The president is directed to
further "certain priorities" most of which are related to labor and envi-
ronmental objectives. All that the bill does is to direct the President to
seek greater cooperation between the World Trade Organization and
the International Labor Organization.
At the other end of the continuum is HR 3019 sponsored by Con-
gressman Charles Rangel of New York and Sander Levin of Michigan
which gives more direction to negotiators to achieve labor and envi-
ronmental goals. Specific objectives for agreements must be under-
taken. Congressional trade advisors are provided for by statute and
the bill would allow withdrawal from any fast-track procedure before
the start of negotiations, during the negotiations, and before the Presi-
dent enters into an agreement if Congressional advisors do not concur
with the President on the issue of whether the agreement "substan-
tially achieves the principal negotiating objectives."142
141. Lenore Sek, Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agree-
ments): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress, CRS IssuE BRIEF
IB10084, Jan. 18, 2002 at 6.
142. Id. at 10.
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Meanwhile; the Senate has passed its own 2002 trade bill, taking
up the Bradley idea and providing both wage insurance and health
insurance to displaced workers.14 3 Much of 2002 has been consumed
with impasse between the Democratic Senate and Republican House
on this subject. 144
In August 2002 the congress enacted and President Bush signed
the Trade Bill with most Republicans supporting it, House Democrats
opposed, the Senate Democrats divided.145 The new law makes labor
and environmental goals "principal negotiating objectives"-but ad-
herence to no particular standards is required. Senator Max Baucus
has emphasized the assistance provided by the law to dislocated work-
ers:' 4 6 (1) coverage of so-called "secondary" workers who are eligible
for benefits and workers "affected" by shifts in production if the com-
pany moves to a nation with which the United States has a free trade
agreemenet or preferential trade agreement-and where no such
agreement exists, benefits ought to be proved if imports are "likely to
increase" as the result of the shift; (2) such older workers provided
wage insurance to supplement lower paying jobs as well as health in-
surance; (3) income support for workers undergoing training extended
from 52 to 78 weeks; (4) 65 percent health insurance reimbursement
through tax credits.
The significance of health insurance may be to revive the call for
comprehensive health insurance reform promoted by both President
Harry Truman and President Bill Clinton. As the Washington Post
has noted:
Among the new benefits such workers will receive is a federal tax credit to
help cover the cost of health insurance. Since almost no one argues that work-
143. The compromise to grant Mr. Bush so-called trade promotion authority
won the support of the Senate Democratic leadership only after weeks of
partisan haggling. It would triple the money spent on aid for displaced
workers to $1.2 billion annually. The government would also begin pay-
ing 70 percent of the health insurance costs for people whose jobs disap-
pear because of imports.
Joseph Kahn, Senate Approves Bill Giving Wider Trade Authority to Bush, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 24, 2002, at A19. See also Kathy Chen & Neil King Jr., Workers Gain
in Trade Equation: Bush Gets Closer on 'Fast Track' Bill by Agreeing to More Aid,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 2002, at A4; Richard W. Stevenson, Partisan Fight on Job
Losses Casts Shadow on Trade Bill, N.Y. TImEs, May 1, 2002, at A19; Neil King
Jr., Senate May Tie Jobless Health Care to Trade Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,
2002, at A2, A16.
144. Neil King Jr., Converting Democrats Is Key to Trade Bill: West Coast Representa-
tives Are in Spotlight as Fast-Track Legislation Hangs in Balance, WALL ST. J.,
Jun. 19, 2002, at A4; Shallagh Murray & Michael Phillips, Fast-Track Bill Runs
into Hurdle; Talks Are Delayed, WALL ST. J., Jun. 21, 2002, at A3, A5.
145. See generally, Promoting the Noble Cause of Commerce, ECONoMsT, Aug. 3, 2002;
Guy de Jonquieres & Edward Alden, A Deal, at Last, FiN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at
57-58, at 10; David Firestone, Senate Approves Bill to Give Bush Trade Authority,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al, A8.
146. Trade Act of 2002, Conference Report, 148 CONG. REc. S7768-S7769 (2002).
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ers who lose their jobs to foreign competition deserve better treatment than
those who become unemployed for other reasons, some believe the bill could
create impetus for extending similar benefits to millions more of the unem-
ployed than it already covers. That hope, in fact, has been one of the Senate
Democrats' main-albeit unspoken-motives. 14 7
Lurking in the background of these debates regarding interna-
tional labor standards are the strengths and deficiencies of the ILO
and the WTO, two institutions with contrasting traditions, attitudes
and authority. We have already noted the problems with the ILO
mechanisms for enforcement and how they contrast with WTO sanc-
tions. One central problem with the WTO relates to its confidentiality
provisions which apply, understandably to conciliation and media-
tion' 48 in dispute resolution,1 49 but also to adjudication itself which
would appear to be appropriately public. There is a lack of trans-
parency and secrecy in the WTO procedures. 5 O Though the WTO ap-
pears not to have provided any justification for this aspect of its
147. Paul Blustein, Trade Bill to Help Laid-Off Workers; Victims of Imports Win Ad-
ded Benefits, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at El.
148. Arnold Zack has proposed a mediation unit in conjunction with the ILO which
would promote compliance with international labor standards:
There seems to be little prospect of governments in developing countries
enforcing their own national-workplace laws-if it means loosing facto-
ries, employment and taxes, let alone conforming to the conventions of
the ILO. And private monitoring is too often a public relations sham-
with little incentive for companies to effectively police their own viola-
tions of basic workplace protections. The multinational corporations are
increasingly sensitive, however, to the power the consumer market and
other organizations may impose, and willing under pressure, for the
short term at least, to provide the accommodation that will perpetuate
sales to the protesting markets. That measure of persuasion more than
enforcement may be effective. The institutionalization through the ILO
of a mediating facility might be a way of bringing compliance when inter-
national political will is now lacking. The NGOs, the consumers, the un-
ions and many responsible retailers are increasingly alert to the
deprivations of workplace protections, and yet they are largely ineffec-
tive in enforcing employers to live up to their international workplace
obligations.
Arnold Zack, How to Improve Labor Standards While Checking Corporate Flight,
Address at the National Policy Forum of the IRRA, Washington D.C. (June 2001)
(transcript on file with the author).
149. A confidentiality demarcation line between conciliation and adjudication was
drawn by the NLRB during my Chairmanship. The rule prohibits disclosure of
discussions, representations and positions taken in conciliation but requires dis-
closure in adjudication. See John T. Delaney & Lamont E. Stallworth, An Evalu-
ation of the NLRB's Settlement Judge Program (2001) (unpublished, on file with
the author).
150. See AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNEx 2, UN-
DERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SE'TLEMENT OF Dis-
PUTEs (1994); THE PROCEDURES FOR THE CIRCULATION AND DERESTRICTION OF
WTO DoComiENTs (1994), WT/LJ160/Rev. 1 (26 July 1996). See Memorandum
from Professor Richard Steinberg to the author (Mar. 21, 2002) (on fie with the
author).
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procedures, unceasing criticism has moved them towards the consid-
eration of reforms in this area.1 51
Yet the difficulties in obtaining consensus which is a prerequisite
for WTO action and the resistance of developing countries to the use of
trade sanctions would seem to make even the use of fines rather than
trade sanctions unacceptable through such a mechanism in the short
run.'5 2 The ILO is the best forum-but a stronger ILO with remedies
at its disposal.
In the near future, therefore, it seems that most of the action,
while borrowing from the institutional resources and standards of
both the ILO and the WTO, will constitute new institutions or dispute
resolutions procedures established through country to country or re-
gional treaties. Perhaps the one with the most fruitful potential is
that designed by Congressman Sander Levin as part of the 2000
China trade bill. The Levin amendment creates a Congressional Ex-
ecutive Commission on China53 which holds hearings (probably not
in China) and produces an annual report on the rule of law and
human rights. Its jurisdiction includes labor and, if does its job, it will
surely clash with the trade union system in China. Hearings are
scheduled in 2002.
Another area in which international labor standards can flourish
are domestic trade laws such as the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) which was established by the 1974 Trade Act,' 5 4 and then
amended in 1984. This initiative, and others155 such as the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative,' 5 6 provide for sanctions. But they contain a
number of problems. The first is that changing political winds will
alter the willingness of the Executive branch to enforce the laws. But
the second is that they exist at the level of the nation-state and smack
of unilaterism, a tendency with which this Bush Administration has
come to be frequently associated. Even the United States-Cambodia
textile agreement undertaken outside of the WTO mechanism which
established a direct linkage between imports and adherence to labor
151. Doha WTO Minesterial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 Para-
graph 10 (Nov. 20, 2001).
152. Daniel T. Griswold, Trade, Labor, and the Environment: How Blue and Green
Sanctions Threaten Higher Standards (Cato Inst. Trade Policy Analysis No. 15,
Aug. 2, 2001).
153. Joseph Kahn, To Aid Trade Bill, Democrat Creates Plan for Rights Panel, N.Y.
Timrvts, May 4, 2000, at A8.
154. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (2000).
155. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Book Review: Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1533, 1647-1550 (1998).
156. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (2000) (requiring consideration of whether a country "has
taken or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country (including any desig-
nated zone in that country) internationally recognized worker rights" in ex-
tending duty free status to 27 Caribbean nations).
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standards allows for unilateral determinations1 57 which may be fun-
damentally protectionist.158
Professor Sarah Cleveland has advocated the use of the Alien Tort
Claims Act as a vehicle for enforcing international labor standards
through labor litigation.i5 9 As she points out, other theories pursued
by private litigants have thus far been remarkably unsuccessful.60
Finally, there is the world of corporate codes of conduct. Again, the
OECD has provided the most substantial inventory of these voluntary
initiatives undertaken by multinational companies operating away
their home base.i61
These codes may look to laws both local and internationally recog-
nized instruments-although international standards such as ILO
Conventions or UN Declarations are explicitly cited in only 18 percent
of the codes. In the critical area of enforcement, it is important to note
that a majority of the codes rely exclusively on internal monitoring. It
would seem that codes are most effective where they provide for some
kind of outside review, preferably with the use of qualified local people
who posses not only the ability and the language but knowledge about
the community and local work practices. Moreover, one other feature
of the monitoring process should allow for unannounced visits and on-
site reviews of the employment relationship. This is critical because,
while many codes address such matters as the level of wages and the
amount of overtime which can be addressed through reviewing the
records of corporations and can be performed by accounting firms,
questions relating to freedom of association, non-discrimination and
particularly allegations of sexual harassment can only be resolved
157. Helen Cooper, Dropped Stitches: A Trade Deal Helps Cambodian Workers, but
Payoff Is Withheld, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at Al, A13.
158. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-Cambodia
Textile Agreement Links Increasing Trade with Improving Workers' Rights (Jan.
7, 2002); First Synthesis Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambo-
dia's Garment Sector (Nov. 2001), at http-//www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue
cambodia.htm; Frederik Balfour & Sheri Prasso, Bumps in Road to Cambodian
Labor Reform (int'l edition): A U.S. Trade Deal Becomes a Test Case in Global
Standards, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2000; John A. Hall, Human Rights and the
Garment Industry in Contemporary Cambodia, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 119 (2000).
159. Cleveland, supra note 155.
160. Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., Inc., 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992);
Int'l Labor Rights Educ. and Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C.
1990), affd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992). But see for some measure of success
the decision by the Texas Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro,
786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
161. ORGANISATION FOR EcoNoMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE
CODES OF CoNDucT: AN INvENTORY (1999); ORGANISATION FOR ECONO~NIC Co-op-
ERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODES OF CONDUCT-AN EXPANDED REVIEV OF THEIR
CONTENTS (2000). C.f William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the
UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501 (2001).
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through observation of the workplace and direct interviews and con-
tact of some form with the parties involved.
A central concern of many of the codes address are relationships
with subcontractors since most of the disputes about adherence to la-
bor standards arise in connection with work done by different corpo-
rate entities, i.e. subcontractors, for major firms in the United States.
Illustrative of these firms are Nike, Levi Strauss, the GAP, Sears,
JCPenny and Wal-Mart.
Concern about labor problems which could be characterized as
sweatshop conditions in industries such clothing and footwear pro-
duced the Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement in the Clinton Ad-
ministration. The overriding objective is to produce a labeling system
as the result of monitoring which could determine which countries
abide by fair labor practices. The objective here is to create sufficient
transparency and competition between firms which are concerned
about loss of business as the result of changes in consumer practices
that working conditions could be improved worldwide.162
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the validity of the argument about a "race to the bottom"
within a country's own borders163-and it must be said that the fact
that relatively successful Canadian labor law is provincial and not na-
tional creates a measure of skepticism about this-there is no general
evidence that the same phenomenon exists internationally. To repeat,
there is no evidence of a "race to the bottom" internationally in the
labor arena. Indeed, the OECD evidence is that countries adopting
the so called "core" standards of the ILO have not been harmed and
they may well have benefited economically as their trade performance
has been enhanced.
But there are substantial arguments for international regulation.
The moral high ground for human rights properly includes labor
rights. The idea associated with such human rights has moved be-
yond national borders. And the outlier countries coupled with China
make it possible that the "race to the bottom" phenomenon could yet
become a pressing one.
Yet the child labor issue demonstrates the care and selectivity
which must be exercised in this area. The absence of cash payments-
a matter which must be addressed through a substantial expansion of
foreign assistance beyond present policies and proposals-seriously
erodes advancement for the families which the child labor policies are
162. Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition,
and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, 26 BOSTON REv.,
FebjMar. 2001, at http'//bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/fung.html.
163. Cox, supra note 54.
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presumably designed to protect. International labor regulation can
only move forward in tandem with major revisions and expansion of
foreign assistance from the rich countries-particularly the United
States.
The world has long recognized that labor rights are an important
part of the idea of democracy accepted throughout the world. The
United States must be an important part of the world and take re-
sponsibility for international regulation. Whatever the success of pri-
vate initiatives, the argument for international regulation, initially at
the regional trade level; is important. As noted, it must be under-
taken with care and caution. It will not diminish as this century's
globalization process moves forward. But the necessary confluence of
labor and the financial assistance demonstrates how uneasy the case
is for this admittedly vital objective.
